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Abstract 
This paper is focused on mapping the current evolution of 
Internet of Things (IoT) and its associated cyber risks for the 
Industry 4.0 (I4.0) sector. We report the results of a qualitative 
empirical study that correlates academic literature with 14 - 
I4.0 frameworks and initiatives. We apply the grounded theory 
approach to synthesise the findings from our literature review, 
to compare the cyber security frameworks and cyber security 
quantitative impact assessment models, with the world leading 
I4.0 technological trends. From the findings, we build a new 
impact assessment model of IoT cyber risk in Industry 4.0. We 
therefore advance the efforts of integrating standards and 
governance into Industry 4.0 and offer a better understanding 
of economics impact assessment models for I4.0. 
1 Introduction 
The evolution of IoT represents multiple categories of cyber-
physical systems, integrating technologies related to smart 
grids, smart homes, intelligent transportation, manufacturing 
and supply chain and smart cities, to name a few. Such new 
technologies come with new types of risks that existing risk 
assessment/management methods are not designed to 
anticipate or predict. Safeguarding an IoT deployment IoT, 
while simultaneously harnessing its economic value, requires 
systematic consideration of multiple factors, including: 
privacy, ethics, trust, reliability, acceptability and security. 
Such a systematic approach would go far to ensure the 
integrity, confidentiality, and availability of the data contained 
in IoT devices and services. Cyber security has been 
recognised as a critical national policy issue. by many countries 
Economic impact of cyber risk and cyber security importance 
is growing as the integration of IoT connected devices into 
smart manufacturing and supply, cities, intelligent transport 
systems, smart grids and more aspects of modern life, 
including banking, finance, autonomous cars and personal 
medical devices. Cyber-attacks are increasing in frequency, 
and the and increasingly target IoT devices (for example the 
Mirai botnet). The severity of future attacks could be much 
greater than what has been observed to date. 
A critical question for government policy and for private sector 
business strategies for IoT connected products, platforms and 
services is the sufficiency of cyber security to minimize cyber 
risk that accompanies IoT deployments. This answer must be 
partially addressed by economic analysis, such as cost and 
frequency analysis of cyber-attacks. Such analysis would 
complement the process of building frameworks and 
methodologies for mitigating the economic impact of cyber 
risk of commercial use of deployments of IoT connected 
products and services.  
The research problem investigated in this paper is the present 
lack of standardised methodology that would measure the cost 
and probabilities of cyber-attacks in specific IoT related 
verticals (ex. connected spaces or commercial and industrial 
IoT equipment) and the economic impact (IoT product, service 
or platform related) of such cyber risk. As a result, the growth 
of the IoT cyber risk finance and insurance markets are lacking 
empirical data to construct actuarial tables. Despite the 
development of models related to the impact of cyber risk, 
there is a lack of such models related to specific IoT verticals. 
Hence, banks and insurers are unable to price IoT cyber risk 
with the same precision as in traditional insurance lines. Even 
more concerning, the current macroeconomic costs estimates 
of cyber-attacks related to IoT products, services and platforms 
are entirely speculative. The approach by ‘early adopters’ that 
IoT products are ‘secure by default’ could be somewhat 
misleading. Even governments advocate security standards ex. 
standards like ISA 99, or C2M2 [1], [2] that accept that the 
truth on the ground is that IoT devices are unable to secure 
themselves, so the logical placement of security capability is in 
the communications network.  
The research methodology in this paper proposes combining 
the Cyber VaR, NIST and FAIR frameworks to build a new 
model for calculating the economic impact of IoT cyber risk. 
There is a limited research on the economic impact of cyber 
risk. There is even less research on the economic impact related 
to cyber risks from different IoT verticals. The economic 
impact of IoT related cyber risks in present time are assessed 
by applying methodologies established before the development 
of IoT verticals (ex. automated, digital, social machines, cyber-
physical and coupled systems). Present day critical 
infrastructure systems are far more complex, creating new risks 
for failures. Further, risk in an IoT deployment might extend to 
  
many entities. A interruption in services delivered by a smart 
grid or smart city would impact many businesses, agencies and 
individuals. For example, failure in MY IoT deployment might 
cost millions due to interrupted services. This creates the 
rationale that a new impact model and assessment 
methodology are needed that would anticipate economic 
impact of cyber risks and benefits from the IoT ecosystem. 
This research would build upon existing cyber risk models (e.g. 
VaR, Cyber VaR). The research aim is to develop a robust 
economic model to estimate the economic impact in IoT 
verticals (ex. communications network, or critical 
infrastructure).  
Genesis of IoT 
The IoT term was created in 1999 [3] and the first IoT 
principles were published shortly after in the book ‘When 
Things Start to Think’ [4]. According to Gartner’s IT Hype 
Cycle, the IoT market adoption will take 5-10 years, as of 2012 
[5]. 
Research rationale  
Cyber risk in the IoT is increasing at an alarming rate and cyber 
security is of increasing relevance to early adopters for 
harnessing economic value from the IoT, without exposing 
critical infrastructure to cyber risks. Some of the technologies 
(not all) that are used every day are (at present) not connected 
with the internet, such as: gas meters, house lights, healthcare 
devices, water distribution systems, cars and other road 
transport vehicles. However, such devices are increasingly 
becoming digitally connected and communicating through 
mobile (or wireless) networks, e.g. M2M. Some examples 
include connected spaces, smart meters and autonomous cars. 
Ultimately IoT may revolutionise our business ecosystem. This 
evolution is triggered by a number of factors and forces. Some 
include: objects connected to the IoT can reduce costs through 
use of the data they collect, create business opportunities, and 
can promote new services. IoT products and services are 
disadvantaged compared to non-connected devices, because of 
the concern over cyber risks. This is similar to the story that 
played out during the emergence of cloud computing. It seems 
likely that customer concern will drive new opportunities for 
promoting cyber security that could lead to reducing this gap 
in competitiveness triggered by higher cost and fears of cyber-
attacks.  
The growth of the IoT market (ex. in the critical infrastructure 
vertical) could increase significantly if policymakers have the 
methodology to assess, predict, analyse and address the 
economic risks of IoT related cyber-attacks in the 
communications network. Without the appropriate risk 
assessment methodology, the likelihood of serious economic 
impact due to attack, can only be determined by subjective 
assessment. Connecting the economic impact of different IoT 
verticals cyber risk to critical infrastructure through impact 
models, can provide feedback sensors and real time data 
mechanisms. This would assist and enable industry and 
policymakers to visualise the problem and address the 
economic risk created by IoT related cyber-attacks. 
New Theoretical Frontiers  
New theoretical model that integrates cyber risks from the 
physical and cyber subsystems is necessary. The new 
theoretical model needs to provide an overall understanding of 
the design, development, and evolution of IoT cyber risks. The 
model needs to integrate theories of IoT, control of physical 
systems, and the interaction between the physical and the 
digital worlds. 
2 Literature review 
Economic value of IoT digital infrastructure 
According to a 2013 Cyber Power Index [6], The United 
Kingdom has been ranked as the overall global superpower 
followed by the United States. However, according to the same 
report, the analysis of industry application of digital 
infrastructure in key sectors (Smart Grids, E-Health, E-
Commerce, Intelligent Transportation and E-Government), 
The United Kingdom drops much lower to the 5th place and 
United States on the 3rd place of the index. It seems that the 
UK and US are strongly protected to withstand digital 
infrastructure cyber-attacks, which is crucial in developing 
digital economy [7]. But the UK and US seem to be lagging 
behind in terms of capabilities to capitalise on the new digital 
era. This lagging behind in the harnessing of economic value 
from digital infrastructure could be caused by the barriers to 
adoption of smart manufacturing technologies (such as cost), 
especially for small enterprises [8]. New infrastructure for 
smart manufacturing technology would create large savings for 
manufacturers, in the US the savings are estimated to $57.4 
billion annually [8]. This could improve the harnessing of 
economic value from digital infrastructure, but the concerns 
about the economic impact of IoT cyber risk would remain [9]–
[21], especially in cyber risk insurance policies for SME’s. For 
example, ICT cyber insurance either gives genuine protection, 
or it offers more of a consulting relationship where the 
insurance provider offers initial training and measures, and will 
come in after an attack to assist in recovery. These approaches 
do not seem to be in the interest of SMEs because the cyber 
insurance can be void (e.g. if the insurance broker finds out that 
a specific software update was not done by midnight of a 
certain date) and the recovery usually comes at a premium 
price. As such, current cyber insurance policies do not seem to 
considerably help with making ICT systems more resilient 
against cyberattacks. If cyber insurance companies could 
predict with precision the maximum economic impact, this 
could enable the insurance companies to provide more 
comprehensive policies which would help SME’s protect 
against cyber risk impact that exceeds their individual risk 
impact tolerance level.  
Economic impact of IoT cyber crime 
Cyber risk has not been clearly quantified through historical 
measures because of the risk environment is changing fast [22]. 
The common figure stated is a loss of $1 trillion to cybercrime, 
but estimates range from: 300bn and $1tn [23], $400bn to over 
$575bn [22], or $400bn to over $2tn [24]. The difference in 
  
these figures shows that the numbers are rough estimates at 
best, and the real economic impact of cyber risk remains 
unknown [24]. The main difficulties in calculating the 
economic impact of cyber risk are the lack of suitable data and 
the lack of universal standardised framework to assess cyber 
risk [25]. Adding to these, there is the need to quantify 
accumulated risk on a shared technology platform (such as 
cloud computing) and hyper-connectivity in the digital supply 
chain [26]. Analysing the economic impact of cyber risk is also 
complicated because of the impact on brand reputation, the cost 
of downtime, legal liability, cost of intellectual property loss, 
and many other variables. Merely the media coverage of cyber 
risk has created such significant economic impact that 
managing risk has become ‘imperative’ [23]. 
Economic impact IoT data ownership  
In terms of data ownership, data privacy and Economic 
lifespan of digital assets, it has already been established that 
digital assets can outlive humans [27], triggering the question 
of data ownership after end of data owners’ life. Adding to this 
argument, a large quantity of low-quality or duplicated data are 
never deleted, creating ‘data pollution’. Such complex topics 
triggers the question of do we need to set a ‘self-deletion’ 
phase. Some studies have simplified the topic with the 
assumption of a limited economic lifespans for all classes of 
digital assets [26]. Because human society is an event driven 
system, where digital abstractions of the physical world have a 
lifespan. 
Economic impact of IoT 
IoT is essential for future economic competitiveness, but 
technological innovations are necessary for harnessing the 
economic value [28]. Maximising the economic impact of IoT 
should contain: extreme-yield agriculture [29] supported by 
energy-aware buildings and cities [7], physical critical 
infrastructure with preventive maintenance, and self-correcting 
cyber-physical systems [28], [29]. On the other hand, the 
economic impact of IoT cyber risk can be quite damaging. The 
electric power grid represents one of the largest complex 
interconnected networks, and under stressed conditions, even a 
single failure can trigger complex cascading effects, creating 
wide-spread failure and blackouts, [29]. Distributed energy 
resource technologies such as wind power, create additional 
stress and vulnerabilities [7], [28], [29].  
Economic Impact of Cyber Risk from the Internet of 
Things 
The world is experiencing the fourth industrial revolution [29]–
[31], where the IoT real-time enabled platforms [7] represents 
the foundation for digital industry [30], [32]. Digital industry 
would be supported with more intelligent, resilient and 
interconnected manufacturing equipment [7], [28], [33]. The 
integration of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, the 
cloud, and IoT will create systems of machines capable of 
interacting with humans [7], [32]. The application of 
behavioural economics into these systems of machines [34] 
already enables market speculation on human behaviour [35] 
and even neuromarketing [36] to determine consumer 
purchasing behaviour. We can expect to see autonomous 
machines adopting the use of this methods to predetermine 
human behaviour [32].  
Technologies that would enable the integration of IoT in the 
digital industry include software defined networks [37] and 
software defined storage [38]. The foundations that IoT and 
CPS industrial integration are built upon are protocols and 
enterprise grade cloud hosting (Carruthers, 2016); AI, machine 
learning, and data analytics [39]; and mesh networks and peer-
to-peer connectivity [40]. IoT transforms the sensory and 
control cyber physical systems, creating security and risk 
management vulnerabilities due to many factors, including 
complexity of the deployment, uncertainty of the 
inventory in the deployment, the access points of the 
deployment to the Internet and from integrating less secured 
or unsecured systems, triggering into the deployment. This 
s many questions on risk management and liability for breaches 
or damages [32]. 
Cyber risk mitigation modelling requires:  
• A management strategy for: espionage, theft, or terrorist 
attacks, which in effect requires electronic and physical 
security [28], [29].  
• Insider threats must also be covered, including interception 
and analysis of non-communications electromagnetic 
radiations [22].  
• A cyber risk mitigation model also requires information 
assurance, data security and protection for data in transit, 
from physical and electronic domains and storage facilities 
[7], [22], [41].  
• A cyber risk mitigation model requires anti-counterfeit and 
supply chain risk management to counteract components 
introduced in the supply chain, modified from its original 
design to enable a disruption or an unauthorised function 
[22], [42].  
• Limiting the source code access to crucial personal 
provides software assurance and application security is 
necessary for eliminating deliberate flaws and 
vulnerabilities [29].  
• A cyber risk mitigation model should be supported with 
forensics, prognostics, and recovery plans, for analysis of 
cyber-attacks and for coordination with agencies 
responsible to identify external cyber-attack vectors [22]. 
Internal track and trace network process can assist in 
determining and prevent the existence of weaknesses in the 
logistics security controls [22].  
• Anti-malicious and anti-tamper system process is needed to 
prevent vulnerabilities identified through reverse 
engineering attacks [22], emphasising the need for security 
and privacy [29]. To prevent continuation of cyber-attacks, 
information sharing and reporting, fast cyber-attack 
  
reporting and shared database resources should also be 
developed ([22], [30].  
3 Research methodology 
This section outlines the research methodology applied in the 
research. The section starts with detailing the models applied 
and adapted. Then the complexities of designing a new impact 
assessment model are discussed. Finally, the early models are 
compared with most research modelling approaches to define 
the rationale for the research methodology applied.  
Economic impact frameworks and models 
The Cyber Value-at-Risk (CyVaR) framework has been 
promoted for standardisation of language, models and methods 
[43] which has been further developed by Deloitte (2016). This 
framework represents the first attempt to understand the 
economic impact of cyber risk for individual organisations [25] 
The first unifying economic framework encompassing the 
cross-disciplinary field of ‘Cybernomics’ proposed 
measurement units for cyber risk [26]. Multidisciplinary 
methodologies are applied, along with established risk 
measurement methods to define individual risk units: e.g. 
MicroMort (MM) for measuring medical risk, Value-at-Risk 
(VaR) for measuring market risk for measuring cyber risk [26]. 
The main weakness of this framework is that it has not been 
tested or validated with real data. It has taken years to validate 
VaR and decades to validate MM due to the time required for 
data collection. Other cyber value analysis methods have 
advanced to calculate the cost of different cyber-attack types 
[44], but the same problem with lack of data to validate the 
model persists. This lack of data has motivated the 
development of a proof of concept method [25] that is based 
on data assumptions. The weakness in this approach is that 
economic impact is calculated on organisations’ ‘stand-alone’ 
cyber risk, because data assumptions can only be made on 
individual cases. However, Business impact for the same risk 
can vary widely between companies based on the specific 
circumstances of each company. Furthermore, that approach 
ignores the correlation effect of organisations sharing 
infrastructure and information, and by default, sharing cyber 
risk exposure. Cyber risk exists in multiple physical, 
information, cognitive, and social domains, (software, 
hardware, firmware, adjacent systems, energy supplies, supply 
chains) and the economic impact is related to these closely 
interconnected systems. This close interconnection of disparate 
systems increases the probability of ‘cascading impacts’ [22]. 
This is of great concern especially in sharing cyber risk in 
critical infrastructure [25], because critical infrastructure is 
vital for a strong digital economy [29]. 
Complexities in building economic impact 
theoretical model  
There are multiple problems in building one theoretical model 
that would rule all of the complexities discussed. There are 
additional complexities that are almost impossible to quantify. 
For example, in information assets such as intellectual property 
of digital information, the future value is lost regardless of 
early detection [25]. Therefore, the economic value of digital 
assets has to reflect their economic functions first before their 
value can be properly assigned [26].  
Table 1 lists a number of cyber risk management 
methodologies as used or proposed in industry and academia.  
Qualitative Methods 
1) The IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL)  
2) Control Objectives for Information and 
Related Technology (COBIT)  
3) ISO/IEC 27005:2011  
4) Information Security Forum (ISF) Simplified 
Process for Risk Identification  (SPRINT) 
and Simple to Apply Risk Analysis (SARA)  
5) Operational Critical Threat and Vulnerability 
Evaluation (OCTAVE)  
6) NIST Special Publication 800-53  
7) NIST Special Publication 800-37  
8) ISO/IEC 31000:2009  
9) Consultative, Objective and Bi-functional 
Risk Analysis (COBRA)  
10) Construct a platform for Risk Analysis of 
Security Critical Systems (CORAS)  
11) Business Process: Information Risk 
Management (BPIRM)  
Quantitative Methods 
12) Information Security Risk Analysis Method 
(ISRAM) 
13) Central computer and Telecommunication 
Agency Risk Analysis and Management 
Method (CRAMM) 
14) BSI Guide- RuSecure- Based on 
15) BS7799 Standard  
16) Cost-Of-Risk Analysis (CORA)  
Existing cyber risk frameworks and methodologies are 
constrained by a number of limitations. Cyber risk assessment 
frameworks are based on security control domains and assess 
security posture, but are not effective in assessing high risk loss 
scenarios developed around critical digital assets [26]. 
Furthermore, cyber risk assessment methodologies have 
created an inconsistency in measuring cyber risk, because of 
the absence of a common point of reference [26].  
Comparison of early and more recent models on the 
economic impact of cyber risk 
Earlier literature suggested methods based on Return on 
Investment (ROI) and Net Present Value (NPV), have been 
proposed to assess the information security investment, that 
include broad set of criteria, including ‘economics of privacy’ 
[45], ‘optimal amount to invest’ [46], ‘risk averseness’ [47], 
but these methods are not validated with real data. In addition, 
cyber risk covers more elements than information security 
financial cost, and a method is needed that would integrate 
cyber risk directly with economics [26]. Because the 
motivation for cyber risk can be different than purely financial 
(ex. espionage), and yet still creating economic impact. 
  
Therefore, the impact should be calculated in terms of average 
and in the most severe scenario [25].  
To make such calculations with a reasonable precision of the 
impact assessment, different modelling approaches need to be 
integrated in a new and more reliable economic impact 
assessment model. This research proposes a design of such 
model for calculating the economic impact of IoT cyber risks, 
by integrating the CyVaR with the MM model and the 
recommendations from earlier models.  
4 The model  
We need a reliable model for costing cybercrime [48] and the 
first step in developing a costing model for IoT cyber risk, is to 
determine the cybercrime units of costings. To determine the 
risk of cybercrime, we refer to established methods for 
calculating risk.  
Risk = Likelihood × Consequences, and cyber-risk can be 
defined as a function of:  
R = {si, pi, xi }, i = 1, 2, ... , N,  
R – risk;  s – the description of a scenario (undesirable 
event);  p – the probability of a scenario;  x – the measure 
of consequences or damage caused by a scenario;  N – the 
number of possible scenarios that may cause damage to a 
system. 
To build a model for calculating the impact of IoT cyber risk, 
we need to combine established risk models [26], such as 
MicroMort (MM) and Value-at-Risk (VaR) for measuring 
market risk and adapt a new cyber risk units for IoT MicroMort 
(IoTMM) and IoT MicroMort2 (IoTMM2) as the value of 
reducing the risk by a given IoTMM.  
The economic functions of IoT assets requires an International 
IoT Asset Classification (IIoTAC). The term is chosen to be 
compliant with the proposed International Digital Asset 
Classification (IDAC) [26].  
IoT digital assets can be categorised as: (1) IoT core value 
assets (IoTCA), where digital assets which are directly part of 
goods or services that T profits from; (1a) IoT digitised assets 
(IoTDA), where goods and services digitised from traditional 
goods and services; (1b) IoT assets born digital, representing 
things and services that are intrinsically digital; and (2) IoT 
operational assets (IoTOA), representing assets that support the 
creation, consumption and distribution of IoT goods and 
service. 
Thing’s (T) IoT composition can be described by the ratio of 
its core value assets to operational assets: 
CA:OA={ci,pi}:{oj,qj} i=1,2,...,Nc, j=1,2,....,No where  
IoTCA – T’s core value assets;  IoTOA – T’s operational 
assets;  c – a type of asset listed in IDAC which is of core 
value to T;  p – T’s core digital asset c;  o – a type of asset 
listed in IDAC which is of operational value to T;  q – T’s 
operational asset o;  Nc – the number of core value assets in 
T;  No – the number of operational assets in T.  
By using the same formula, T’s DA (digitised assets) to AD 
(assets born digital) ratio can also be calculated. T’s digital 
value composition describes its nature of innovation, e.g. 
traditional goods have a high OA:CA ratio, while software has 
a high CA:OA ratio and a high AD:DA ratio. Other valuation 
parameters are: Intrinsic value of IoT digital asset can be 
determined through fundamental analysis without reference to 
its market value. Market value of IoT digital asset is the price 
at which the digital valuable would trade in a competitive 
market. Subjective value of IoT digital asset is determined by 
the importance the T places on it.  
Following these valuation parameters, the value of (1a) IoT 
assets is directly converted from their physical equivalents. 
The value of (1b) IoT assets requires their own valuation 
analyses. (2) IoT assets can be valued with Business Impact 
Analysis (BIA). According to this formula of the existing 
economic theory of value to digital asset, the T’s total digital 
value can be calculated as: 
 
where:  
V – total digital value of T;  cv – value of core value asset c 
of T;  ov – value of operational asset o of T;  Nc – the 
number of core value assets in T; No – the number of 
operational assets in T.  
This valuation requires Key IoT Cyber Risk Factors 
(KIoTCRF) correlated with a T’s risk profile. Established Key 
Cyber Risk Factors (KCRF) risk categorisations [26] can be 
adopted to IoT, where: Technological factors are related to the 
usage of technology. Non-technological factors are related to: 
people, process, socio- economic, geo-political factors. 
Inherent factors are related to T’s nature of business, industry, 
core operations, goods and services. Control factors represent 
T’s control effectiveness against cyber loss. Therefore, the T’s 
residual cyber risk can be calculated as:  Residual cyber risk 
= inherent risk ÷ control effectiveness. This valuation allows 
for MM to be applied to define cyber risk units for class D 
assets and to define IoT MicroMortD (IoTMMD) for a given 
class D digital assets as 1 in a million probability of its digital 
death, where the value of 1 IoTMMD is the amount of money 
T is willing to pay to reduce 1 IoTMMD for its class D assets. 
Since IoT residual risk IoTMM is not statistically available, 
when it becomes statistically available for various types of IoT 
assets, it could be aggregated with asset values to generate a 
cyber VaR curve, representing T’s residual cyber risk:   
 
  
To compute the cyber VaR curve, historical simulation and 
Monte Carlo simulation can be used, where VaR is Value-at-
Risk for all IoT digital assets of T; T’s digital asset inventory 
D = {D1, D2, ..., Dn}; the value of each asset V = {V1, V2, ..., 
Vn}; and fDi is the amount of residual risk Di is exposed to, 
measured in IoTMMD is. Monte Carlo can generate a large 
number of paths using repeated random sampling to produce a 
probability distribution. In this scenario, the risk measure 
IoTMM2 can be defined as a 12-month IoTMM2 VaR 
representing the loss limit T can afford from cyber incidents. 
Where IoTMM2 is the cost T is willing to pay to reduce its 
IoTMM2 by 1% for the same loss limit. The VaR can be 
calculated for 12 months to represents cyber risk exposure over 
one financial year, required for budget planning in ERM 
frameworks.  
The proposed valuation depends on advanced data analytics, 
capable to support a trajectory of exponential growth. We have 
the advantage of storing and processing large datasets, hence 
the main obstacle is not the lack of capabilities to compute 
datasets, but to break down non-technological barriers and 
establish a wide range of data points in the proposed categories. 
It may take years or decades to validate the economic impact 
of IoT cyber risk, because of the time required for data 
collection. However, it is important to set the categories in 
order for the data collection to be performed in a structured 
manner. 
5 Applying the proposed model for IoT 
MicroMort calculations   
To test, validate and verify the findings of the new model, (a) 
the IoTMM for 2017 is calculated; and (b) for 2020 is 
forecasted, from the following data. There are estimated 378 
Million Devices Potentially Vulnerable to Hacking in 2017 out 
of 8.4 billion connected things [49]. These numbers emerged 
from the BullGuard's IoT Scanner, where 310,000 users 
scanned their network for vulnerabilities and 4.5 percent 
(nearly 14,000 devices), were reported as ‘could be easily 
hacked’. This data is combined with Garner report that 8.4 
billion connected things will be in use worldwide in 2017 [50]. 
To forecast the IoTMM for 2020, the forecasted data is used 
from the same report showing that the number of IoT 
connected devices will reach 20.4 billion by 2020, with more 
than 900 million potentially vulnerable devices by 2020.  
Therefore, (a) the IoTMM for 2017 is calculated as 0.045 
and (b) the IoTMM for 2020 is calculated as 0.044 
The next step is to calculate the enterprises ‘willingness to pay’ 
to reduce 1 IoTMM. This is representative of the cost sum for 
an enterprise to accept a one-in-a-million IoTMM, or the cost 
sum that enterprise might be willing to pay to avoid a one-in-
a-million chance of IoTMM. For the purposes of testing this 
model, we could apply a nominal Value of a Statistical Life 
(VSL) or the Value for Preventing a Fatality (VPF) to evaluate 
the cost-effectiveness of expenditure on cyber security. The 
IoT security spending is estimated to increase to $840.5 million 
in 2020 [51]. This would IoT market value of 1 IoTMM in 2020 
as $840.5. However, it is important to understand what does 
the value of 1 IoTMM represent in this scenario. We can 
explain this with an example, e.g. each T in a sample of 
100,000 T’s willingness to pay for a reduction in their 
individual IoT risk of 1 in 100,000, or 0.001%, over the next 
year. Since this reduction in risk would mean that we would 
expect one fewer IoTMM among the sample of 100,000 T’s 
over the next year on average. Supposing that the answer was 
$840.5, then the total dollar amount that the group would be 
willing to pay to save one statistical life in a year would be 
$840.5 per T × 100,000 T’s, or $84,050,000 million. This is a 
very generic estimate that cannot be used by governments as 
guidance point for creating standards and governance. 
Calculating the IoTMM for 8.4 billion connected things would 
result with a number far greater than the estimated IoT security 
spending of $840.5 million in 2020. Unfortunately, we have no 
data as to how the experts estimated the IoT security spending, 
and the utility functions in such estimates are often not linear. 
Therefore, the economic value of 1 IoTMM does not represent 
a precise calculation of the value and risk. It represents more 
of a guidance point to show that as more IoT devices become 
connected, their cyber security is not competitively priced, 
which increases the risk, and we need to be aware that we have 
no precise calculation of the IoT cyber risk, or cyber risk in 
general.  
Enterprises can obtain a valuation more precise to their T’s by 
assessing the previously described valuation formula where 
T’s digital asset inventory D = {D1, D2, ..., Dn}; combined 
with the value of each asset V = {V1, V2, ..., Vn}; and fDi is 
the amount of residual risk Di is exposed to, measured in 
IoTMMD is. Resulting with the calculation of the value of 1 
IoTMMD in 2020 as the amount of money T is willing to pay 
to reduce 1 IoTMMD for its class D assets, valued with: 
  
6 Discussion 
The figures we are applying are just to verify the new model. 
Since there is no International IoT Asset Classification 
(IIoTAC) and no established Key IoT Cyber Risk Factors 
(KIoTCRF), the calculations of the new model serve just to 
verify the new model. After the establishment of IIoTAC and 
KIoTCRF, the new model could be applied to calculate more 
precise ‘willingness to pay’ that T is willing to pay to reduce 1 
IoTMMD. 
We need to mention that the local linearity of the utility curve 
means that the MicroMort is useful for small incremental risks 
and rewards, not necessarily for large risks. Therefore, the 
IoTMM is not an ideal measure to calculate the IoT risk. 
Instead, IoTMM is better placed to measure for a given T 
willingness to pay to reduce 1 IoTMMD for its class D assets.  
Finally, we need to discuss the lack of IoT data. For example, 
the latest forecast from Gartner Inc. says worldwide 
information security spending will reach $86.4 billion (USD) 
in 2017 and $93 billion in 2018. That forecast doesn’t cover 
  
the IoT, ICS (Industrial Control Systems) and IIoT (Industrial 
Internet of Things) security [52]. Given the lack of data on IoT 
cyber risk, cyber loss, or profits from different IoT vectors, it 
is extremely difficult to conduct IoT cyber risk analysis and 
argue on the soundness of the analysis. Since the cyber 
insurance is in its infancy, insurance companies have not 
mastered the valuation of cyber risk in general. For example, 
Target was insured for $100 millions of cyber risk in 2017, and 
suffered over $450 millions of loss, with estimated to total at 
$1 billion by the end of 2017 [53]. This example clearly states 
that cyber insurance needs a lot more data to calculate, 
correlated and transfer risk with an acceptable degree of 
certainty. While general cyber risk cannot be calculated, the 
emergence of IoT has created new IoT risk vectors that are not 
at all defined in the cyber insurance policies. 
7 Conclusion  
The findings from this research lead to the conclusion that there 
many challenges in understanding the types and nature of cyber 
risk and their dependencies/interactions in this new space. This 
paper informs on how one may assess economic impact with 
mathematical formalisms.  
The multiple complexities explained in the study, in terms of 
calculating the economic impact of IoT cyber risk, also lead to 
the conclusion that impact can only be assessed with new risk 
metrics, and a new valuation method specific for the new risk 
metrics, combined with new regulatory framework and 
standardisation IoT data bases with new risk vectors as defined 
in the form of International IoT Asset Classification (IIoTAC) 
and Key IoT Cyber Risk Factors (KIoTCRF). 
This paper presents new risk metrics, by adapting established 
methods for calculating risks and uncertainties, and identifies 
some specific grand challenges for calculating the economic 
impact of IoT cyber risk. The paper combined common basic 
terminology, common approaches and incorporated existing 
standards into a new model for calculating the economic 
impact of IoT cyber risk. 
This work was supported by the UK EPSRC with project [grant 
number EP/N02334X/1 and EP/N023013/1] and by the Cisco 
Research Centre [grant number 2017-169701 (3696)].  
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